In , we proposed a novel neural network model of short-term memory for serial order. We reply here to a critique of this work put forth by Bowers, Damian, and Davis (2009) .
We are grateful to Bowers et al. (2009) for clearly acknowledging a distinctive strength of the model: its ability to account for the impact of domain-specific background knowledge on serial recall. As discussed at length in Botvinick and Plaut, immediate serial recall in humans is strongly affected by the structure of the sequences to be remembered. When this structure fits well with the statistics of previously encountered material, enhanced recall is generally observed. The fact that the Botvinick and Plaut model also displays this characteristic allows it to account naturally for effects of bigram frequency and phonotactic regularity and also to simulate a rich set of results from studies examining memory for sequences generated from artificial grammars (Botvinick, 2005; Botvinick & Bylsma, 2005) .
Although Bowers et al. (2009) did acknowledge this aspect of our model, they then went on to portray it not as an asset but as a fatal flaw. The model, they argued, is "too sensitive" to the details of previous experience. In particular, they suggested, the model shows an insufficient ability to encode arbitrary new sequences, including sequences containing previously unencountered items. Bowers et al. attributed this supposed difficulty to the way in which the Botvinick and Plaut model represents sequence information. As detailed in our original article, the model relies on conjunctive representations of item and order, in which the way that an item is represented depends on the ordinal position at which it appears. Bowers et al. saw dire problems in such "context-sensitive" representations. Indeed, portraying context-sensitive representation as a hallmark of connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, they asked the reader to accept their observations concerning the Botvinick and Plaut model as grounds for rejecting connectionist models in general.
In principle, we welcome the kind of theoretical debate Bowers et al. (2009) sought to generate. However, their specific assertions simply do not hold up to scrutiny. As we explain in the sections below, their critique of the model is directly contradicted by abundant empirical data and rests upon simulation results that are either innocuous or irrelevant. Their larger critique of connectionist modeling is predicated on false premises concerning the functional implications of contextdependent representation, as well as a basic misunderstanding of the connectionist approach. All in all, we worry that their critique of our work may have done more to obscure the important issues than to illuminate them.
Taking Account of the Empirical Data
Despite the skepticism Bowers et al. (2009) expressed toward context-dependent representations, once all the relevant empirical data are considered, it becomes very nearly impossible to deny the involvement of such representations in serial order memory. In particular, although Bowers et al. made no mention of it, there have been at least seven studies examining neural activity during serial recall in nonhuman primates (Barone & Joseph, 1989; Funahashi, Inoue, & Kubota, 1997; Inoue & Mikami, 2006; Kermadi & Joseph, 1995; Kermadi, Jurquet, Arzi, & Joseph, 1993; Ninokura, Mushiake, & Tanji, 2003 , 2004 , and a central finding in every one of these has been that item information is encoded in a way that depends on serial position. A representative finding from the work of Inoue and Mikami (2006) is shown in Figure 1 (for further discussion, see Botvinick & Watanabe, 2007) .
Unless Bowers et al. (2009) wish to assert that these neuroscientific data are spurious, or that they are not germane to human immediate serial recall, it seems unproductive to debate the relevance of context-dependent representations in this domain. Present evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the brain employs such representations. Barring the emergence of contradictory evidence, the scientific challenge is to determine how these representations are instantiated and updated during encoding, how they are maintained during retention, how they are read out during recall, and how they may be shaped by experience.
It is these questions that the model strives to address. Of course, its success in doing so must be judged against how well it accounts for the details of human performance in serial recall. Bowers et al. (2009) argued that the model fails in important ways and claimed to document its failure in a set of follow-up simulations. It is to these we now turn.
Simulation Results Bowers et al. (2009) presented a series of seven simulations. It is surprising that the first six of these present no problem at all for the model. Together, these simulations simply show that the model generalizes to new sequences more readily when distributed, rather than localist, item representations are used. The fact that distributed representations support generalization has been a central message of connectionist modeling since the 1980s. To see this point substantiated yet again, in the context of serial recall, is satisfying, if not particularly surprising. In any case, we fail to see what challenge is implied to the Botvinick and Plaut account. Indeed, we noted in that article (p. 205) that our use of localist item representations was an implementational convenience, rather than a core aspect of the account, and indeed, some of the simulations reported in Botvinick and Plaut actually used distributed item representations.
This brings us to Bowers et al.'s (2009) Simulation 7. This simulation was intended to model a thought experiment, which lies at the heart of the critique. Bowers et al. asked the reader to imagine a scenario in which someone learns a new letter-name, "ree," and is asked to repeat back a short sequence containing this new item in the first ordinal position (e.g., "ree, B"). Having completed this task, they noted, the same individual should have no trouble then repeating back a sequence in which "ree" appears in another ordinal position (e.g., "B, ree"). In Simulation 7, Bowers et al. purported to show that the model cannot simulate this scenario. The model was first trained on a set of 25 items. A 26th item was then introduced, and the model received massive training on sequences in which this item appeared at position one. The model was then shown to have difficulty recalling sequences in which the new item appeared in other positions.
A little reflection should reveal that this simulation bears little relation to the scenario described in the thought experiment. The individual in that experiment did not receive massive training on sequences containing the novel item. Instead, he or she immediately repeated back one sequence ("ree-B"), and then another ("B-ree"). A proper simulation of the thought experiment would therefore involve presenting the model with a novel item and seeing whether it can recall that item at any ordinal position immediately, without any interposed training.
In fact, the model handles this situation just fine. To demonstrate this, we trained the model on items meant to represent syllables (reasoning that most letter names take this form). The input layer contained three sets of 10 units, respectively representing onset, nucleus, and coda.
1 A syllable was represented by activating one unit from each of these groups. The model was trained to recall sequences of syllables following the procedures used in . It is important to note that one specific syllable was avoided during training. By analogy to Bowers et al.'s (2009) thought experiment, let us refer to this syllable as "ree." Following training, the model's weights were held constant, and it was tested on sequences in which ree appeared in position one (e.g., "ree, B"). The model recalled these sequences without error. Not surprising, the model then went on to perform perfectly on sequences in which ree appeared at other ordinal positions (e.g., "B, ree").
Naturally, we take no issue with the assertion that "a participant who recalls ree-B can also succeed on the sequence B-ree" (Bow- The only problem with this formulation is that it is not true. Indeed, both of its two premises are belied by existing computational models in the area of serial order memory. The first premise is contradicted, for example, by the model recently proposed by Burgess and Hitch (2006) , which relies on links between contextindependent item and position representations, but which shows recall performance strongly affected by earlier learning. The second premise, in turn, is contradicted by the primacy model proposed by , which uses conjunctive representations of item and order, but which is capable of encoding arbitrary sequences. There is, of course, an interesting and important relationship between representational form and generalization behavior, a relationship that has been explored throughout the connectionist literature and well beyond. The nature of this relationship is, however, not as simple as the one Bowers et al. (2009) 
A Straw-Man Critique of Connectionist Modeling
By criticizing the use of context-dependent representations, Bowers et al. (2009) intended to call into question connectionist modeling at large. However, by conflating connectionist/PDP modeling with context-dependent representation, Bowers et al. revealed a fundamental misunderstanding. They asserted that "a core claim of the PDP approach is that all knowledge is coded in a context dependent manner" (p. 7). This is simply untrue. In fact, the approach takes no specific stance on the degree to which the representation of an entity is dependent or independent of the contexts in which it occurs. Rather, one of the main tenets of the approach is to discover, rather than stipulate, representations (Plaut & McClelland, 2000) . Internal representations are learned under the pressure of performing specific tasks, and the degree to which they exhibit context dependence is a consequence of basic network mechanisms, the learning procedure, and the structure of the tasks to be learned. For example, Plaut and Gonnerman (2000) trained a network to comprehend morphologically complex words that varied in semantic transparency (i.e., the degree to which the meaning of a word is consistent with the independent meanings of its component morphemes). When a set of words was embedded in an artificial language in which other words were transparent, the representations of their morphemes were largely contextindependent (as reflected by patterns of morphological priming). By contrast, when the same words were embedded in a language in which other words were opaque, morphemes were given context-dependent representations in which the degree of dependence varied as a function of the word's transparency. Thus, contrary to Bowers et al.'s claims, PDP networks are not restricted to learning context-dependent representations but can develop representations that span the full range from context dependence to context independence. Indeed, specifically noted that their networks carried some context-independent information about item and order (p. 228) and discussed the potential role of weight-based associations between contextindependent representations in serial order memory (p. 233).
Conclusions
In this brief reply, we have rejected the comments and conclusions of Bowers et al. (2009) on several grounds. First, we have noted the existence of abundant empirical data contradicting their arguments. Second, we have shown why their simulation results in fact present no challenge to our model. Third, we have questioned several basic premises underpinning their theoretical polemic.
If Bowers and colleagues are serious about modeling short-term memory for serial order, then the ball now bounces back to them and others who advocate for context-independent representations of item and order. Having failed to show that the model has unreasonable difficulty with arbitrary sequences, the burden of proof now falls upon Bowers and colleagues to demonstrate that models using context-independent representations can capture the effects of background knowledge that are so well captured by the Botvinick and Plaut model. Bowers and colleagues appealed to the notion that introducing "chunks" might allow this. This idea has been bandied about informally since at least the early 1980s, but we still await a serious attempt 2 Out of curiosity, we reran Simulation 7 from Bowers et al. (2009) , using the item representations just described. This yielded starkly different results from those reported by Bowers et al. Specifically, even after extensive training where ree only ever appeared in position one, the model had absolutely no trouble recalling that item at other ordinal positions. It turns out that the difficulty Bowers et al. observed in their Simulation 7 had nothing to do with serial order memory but related instead simply to item encoding. Upon initial presentation of the initially withheld item in their simulation, the model did not even correctly shadow the item during encoding, nor did the model correctly recall when it was presented in isolation (i.e., as a one-item list; J. Bowers, personal communication, March 13, 2009 ). The correlations among item features, given the structure of the training set, were evidently strong enough during initial training that the model had effectively been trained not to be able to encode the novel item, much as human subjects find it difficult to encode syllables that are phonotactically highly irregular, as shown, for example, by Brown and Hildum (1956) . The results Bowers et al. reported thus reflect, in part, an idiosyncratic (and arguably ecologically invalid) aspect of their item representations.
to implement it in a runable model so that it can be tested against existing empirical data. model, Bowers et al. seem to have found a corner of parameter space where compositional coding predominates, and previous experience with specific feature combinations has little impact on recall performance. However, a cursory glance at the PDP literature makes clear that, given a reasonable training environment, PDP models are quite capable of striking a balance between flexibility on the one hand and sensitivity to structure on the other. Indeed, this point has been made in precisely the domain Bowers et al. staked out for their own demonstration: word versus nonword reading (see Plaut & McClelland, 1993) .
There is some irony in the fact that Bowers et al.'s (2009) closing criticism of our model focused on the issue of sensitivity to previous learning, because, as we emphasized in BP06, this is an area where traditional "context-independent" models face substantial difficulty. To our gratification, the last couple of years have seen a resurgence of interest in the role of learning in short-term memory for serial order (see Thorn & Page, 2008) . The critique of our model offered by Bowers et al. contributes to this welcome development by drawing attention to the inherent tradeoff between learning and flexibility. In so doing, however, the critique does little to challenge the viability of the BP06 model.
